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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of directors’ ownership on the financial 
performance of firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012. The method uses 
quantitative approach, namely multiple linear regression. The financial performance is measured with 
return on assets (ROA). The research shows that directors’ ownership does not significantly influence 
firm performance. This implies that directors’ ownership of listed firms in Indonesia is not proven to get 
the interests of directors and shareholders aligned. This paper is particularly important to the 
policymakers and shareholders of firms in Indonesia and other developing economies since it provides 
a comprehensive insight into the directors’ ownership – firm performance relationship and therefore it 
helps them to formulate the best policies. 
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Abstrak 
 
Tujuan makalah ini adalah untuk meneliti pengaruh kepemilikan direktur terhadap kinerja keuangan 
perusahaan-perusahaan yang tercatat pada Bursa Efek Indonesia dari tahun 2008 hingga 2012. Metode 
yang digunakan adalah metode kuantitatif, yaitu regresi linier berganda. Kinerja keuangan diukur 
dengan return on assets (ROA). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan direktur perusahaan 
tercatat di Indonesia tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan tersebut. 
Temuan ini menyiratkan kepemilikan direktur tidak terbukti dapat menyelaraskan kepentingan direktur 
dan para pemegang saham. Makalah ini terutama penting bagi para pengambil kebijakan dan pemegang 
saham pada perusahaan-perusahaan di Indonesia dan negara-negara berkembang lainnya karena 
menyediakan tinjauan yang komprehensif terhadap hubungan kepemilikan direktur dan kinerja 
keuangan, sehingga dapat membantu mereka dalam merumuskan kebijakan-kebijakan terbaik. 
 
Kata kunci: ROA, kepemilikan direktur, kinerja perusahaan 
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A.  INTRODUCTION 
There are ample literatures that have discussed the effect or influence of directors’ ownership 
on firm performance which are predominantly based on agency theory. While those literatures mainly 
deal with the context of developed economies, this paper examines the relationship between directors’ 
ownership and financial performance of listed companies in Indonesia, one of developing economies in 
Asia. 
The ownership of a modern corporation is usually separated with control. At the early 20th 
century, Berle and Means (1932) highlighted that the ownership and control of corporations became 
separated following the countries’ industrialization and market development. Such separation is more 
prevalent in common-law countries (e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom) and less so in civil-
law countries (e.g. Latin America countries) (Mallin, 2019). 
Nevertheless, the ownership and control converge when they are in the hand of the same 
individuals. This is the case when directors own some portion of the shares of the company, he/she 
controls. In this regard, it is presumed that the actions taken by the directors would not reduce 
shareholder wealth regardless their independence degree (Booth et al., 2002). 
According to Keasey et al. (1994), previous studies assume that when directors hold shares of 
a company they control, they and external shareholders hold similar value maximising objectives. 
However, it is also feared that the increased directors’ ownership will give power to the directors to 
improve their own compensation and perquisites. 
In terms of attitude towards risk, Keasey et al. (1994) argued that the risk aversion of a director 
depends on the existence of his/her directorship in other firms or his/her ownership level at a firm 
he/she controls. In other words, the directors will be less risk averse if they hold directorship in other 
firms. 
Vance (1983) in Kesner (1987) suggested that stock ownership by directors has greater 
influence than the issue of inside/outside directors. With regard to outside directors, Peasnell et al. 
(2003) argued that the demand for monitoring mechanisms by outside directors is predicted to be 
reduced when there is managerial equity ownership due to its incentive-alignment effects. 
According to modern portfolio theory, managers who own stocks in their firm should sell their 
shares to diversify away the unsystematic risk related with wealth concentration in a single asset. The 
risk of managerial ownership is higher than that of ordinary ownership because executives already have 
human capital value correlated with firm performance (Ofek & Yermack, 2000).  
Actually, managerial equity ownership is one well known solution to prevent them from using 
corporate assets for their personal benefit rather than for maximising shareholder wealth (moral hazard 
problem) (Himmelberg et al, 1999). Nevertheless, when equity ownership by managers is too high, they 
will be insulated from external market discipline and this will create managerial entrenchment problems 
(McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). Due to this contradictory effect of managerial equity 
ownership, I am interested to investigate how it influences firm performance in Indonesia. Therefore, 
the problem statement of this study is: does directors’ ownership influence firm performance in 
Indonesia? 
The objective of this study is to investigate the influence of directors’ ownership on firm 
performance in Indonesia. The organization of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents 
the literature review on directors’ ownership. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Section 4 
presents the summary of the findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggested that greater uncertainty which includes instability of prices, 
technology, market shares, and so forth causes greater directors’ ownership of a firm. In addition, they 
also argued that firm riskiness (measured by stock price volatility) determines directors’ ownership. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) believed that main variables in the contracting environment, namely firm size, 
scope for discretionary spending, managerial risk aversion (i.e. observable firm characteristics) influence 
managerial ownership in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. Furthermore, 
they also argued that directors’ ownership becomes an optimal incentive arrangement of a firm if the 
ownership level is adjusted with the scope for perquisite consumption. 
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Scholars are split in their opinion on the relationship between directors’ ownership and firm 
performance. On the one hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that increasing the fraction of shares 
owned by corporate insiders will cause the increase in firm value. This is in line with agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which postulates that common stock ownership by managers (insider 
ownership) may reduce agency costs because it better aligns their interests with those of stockholders. 
Hill and Snell (1989) believed that when directors’ hold significant portion of stocks of firms they direct, 
it is more likely that they make decisions consistent with stockholders’ wealth maximisation due to the 
fact that they are also stockholders. Grossman and Hart (1986) argued that transaction costs are greater 
when managerial ownership is removed. This implies that managerial ownership has the potential to 
reduce agency conflicts and hence improve firm performance. Farrer and Ramsay (1998) also implied 
that directors’ ownership is important in Australia. This can be seen in the minimum share ownership 
requirement for directors in some companies in that country, suggesting that the ownership can provide 
incentives to directors to maximise firm performance. Other scholars like Mehran (1995), Han and Suk 
(1998), Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) also found the positive 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. 
On the other hand, as also argued Farrer and Ramsay (1998), excessive directors’ shareholding 
accompanied with the absence of their wealth diversification will not make the directors’ interest aligned 
with those of outsider shareholders because the directors become more risk averse. This argument is 
also shared by Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) who argued that entrenchment effect appears when 
directors’ ownership reaches certain level and this effect negatively influences firm performance. And 
more recently, Rashid (2016) found both the convergence of interest and entrenchment in his 
investigation on managerial ownership and agency cost among listed firms in Bangladesh. 
 
 
C. RESEARCH METHOD 
 This study uses quantitative approach. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) in Sale et al. (2002) stated 
that the quantitative approach is used to measure and analyse causal relationship between variables 
within a value-free framework. The research method used is the statistical associative method as it is 
intended to present facts concerning the nature and status of a situation, as it exists at the time of the 
study and to describe the relationship between directors’ ownership and firm performance in Indonesia. 
In this study, the quantitative approach used is multiple linear regression where firm performance is 
dependent variable and directors’ ownership is independent variable. 
  
1. Data, variable and sample characteristics 
The data population is 140 industrial and manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The population comes from an independent website about listed firms on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Of the population, 43 companies meet the sampling criteria. 
The sampling criteria are as follows: 
1. Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange on or prior to 2 January 2008 and remain listed until 31 
December 2012. 
2. Have complete information required in this research. 
3. Financial year end at 31 December from 2008 to 2012. 
 
The sample size is considerably small if compared to the population. The smallness of the sample 
size is largely a result of the incompleteness of information required from the firms. Hence, firms with 
incomplete required information have to be removed from the samples. In this paper, firm performance 
is measured with return on assets (ROA). Directors’ ownership is measured with the total percentage of 
common stock owned by the directors. Firm size (measured with total assets) and sales growth serve 
as control variables. 
The research method used in this paper involves the collation of data of 43 manufacturing 
companies available from online financial databases (secondary data), i.e. Thomson One and Orbis. The 
research analysis is conducted with the utilisation of a software package used for statistical analysis. 
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2. Regression Model 
To investigate the influence of directors’ ownership on firm performance in Indonesia, the 
following model is used: 
ROA = ß0 + ß1DO + ß2TA+ ß3SG + u 
where: 
ROA = return on assets 
DO = directors’ ownership 
TA = total assets 
SG = sales growth 
 
 
D. DISCUSSION 
In this section, the empirical results of this research are presented. Before going further, the 
table of average values of ROA and directors’ ownership Indonesia is presented as follows. 
 
Table 1 Average values of ROA and   
directors’ ownership in Indonesia 
 
No. Variables  Average Values 
1. Return on Assets  6.61% 
2. Directors‘ Ownership  4.28% 
 
1. Return on Assets 
The sampled firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have an average ROA of 6.61% 
during the period of 2008 to 2012. The average ROA reached the lowest level in 2008 (3.64%) and it 
reached its highest level in 2011 (7.58%). 
 
2. Directors’ Ownership 
Directors’ ownership in this research is measured with the sum of common stock ownership of 
directors in percentage. The directors of sampled firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have an 
average common stock ownership of 4.28% during the period of 2008 to 2012. The lowest average 
occurred in 2008 (3.75%) and the highest occurred in 2012 (4.49%). The majority of the firms have 
no directors’ ownership. 
 
3. Relationship between Directors’ Ownership and ROA 
The relationship between directors’ ownership and firm performance in Indonesia will be 
investigated below. 
 
Table 2 Regression result of the relationship between 
directors’ ownership and ROA in Indonesia 
 Coefficientsa 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
 
On Table 2, we can see that the p value of directors’ ownership (0.158) is greater than α value 
(0.05). Therefore, directors’ ownership does not significantly influence ROA of firms in Indonesia. Table 
1 in Appendix shows that the value of R square is 0.076; meaning that 7.6% of the variation of ROA 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,437 ,838  6,489 ,000 
Directors' Ownership -,071 ,050 -,095 -1,419 ,158 
Total Assets ,003 ,003 ,067 ,998 ,319 
Sales Growth ,079 ,022 ,235 3,518 ,001 
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can be explained by independent variables in the model and 92.4% of it is explained by other variables 
not included in the model. 
Table 2 also shows that sales growth significantly and positively influences ROA (p value = 
0.001). To further investigate such influence, the samples of firms are divided according to their sales 
growth and then the regression using samples of growing and non-growing firms is conducted. Firms 
with sales growth above average fall into growing firms’ category, and those with sales growth below 
average fall into non-growing firms’ category. The average sales growth of firms in Indonesia in this 
research is 12.65%. Below are the tables of the regression analysis for both firm groups. 
 
 
Table 3 Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and ROA of 
growing firms in Indonesia (101 observations) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 9,548 1,495  6,387 ,000 
Directors' Ownership -,137 ,064 -,209 -2,134 ,035 
Total Assets ,006 ,003 ,168 1,709 ,091 
Sales Growth -,043 ,034 -,124 -1,273 ,206 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
 
 
Table 4 Regression result of the relationship between directors’ ownership and 
ROA in non-growing firms in Indonesia (114 observations) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 6,855 1,269  5,400 ,000 
Directors' Ownership -,056 ,070 -,072 -,800 ,425 
Total Assets -,001 ,005 -,025 -,282 ,779 
Sales Growth ,254 ,061 ,375 4,201 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
 
It appears on Table 3 that directors’ ownership has a negative and significant effect on ROA of 
growing firms in Indonesia (p value = 0.035). Conversely for non-growing firms as shown in Table 4, 
directors’ ownership does not significantly influence ROA (p value = 0.425). In addition, sales growth 
only significantly and positively influences ROA of non-growing firms (p value = 0). 
The results above show that in general, the ROA of firms in Indonesia is not significantly 
influenced by directors’ ownership. This finding contradicts the literature mentioned in this paper which 
shows positive and/or negative relationship between directors’ ownership and ROA. In terms of the 
relationship between directors’ ownership and firm performance in growing and non-growing firms, 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the influence of directors’ ownership on firm performance is stronger in growing 
firms. 
 
4. Multicollinearity and Autocorrelation Test 
In order to check whether the regression models are free from multicollinearity and 
autocorrelation, collinearity statistics and Durbin-Watson values are used. Multicollinearity does not 
occur when tolerance value is equal to or above 0.1 (Field, 2013) and variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
below 5 or 10 (O’Brien, 2007). On the other hand, positive autocorrelation occurs when d is less than dl 
(lower bound) and negative autocorrelation occurs when (4 – d) is less than du. The multicollinearity 
and autocorrelation tests show that the regression models are free from these two statistical problems. 
More details on these tests can be seen in the tables below. 
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Table 5 Collinearity statistics for regression model of all firms 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Directors' Ownership ,976 1,024 
Total Assets ,957 1,044 
Sales Growth ,980 1,020 
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets 
 
 
Table 6 R-Square and Durbin-Watson values of regression model of all firms 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 ,276a ,076 ,063 8,63721 2,175 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sales Growth, Directors' Ownership, Total Assets 
b. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
dl  value = 1.338 
du value = 1.659 
 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
1. Summary 
This paper addresses the question whether directors’ ownership influences firm performance in 
Indonesia. The results presented in this paper conclude that in general, directors’ ownership does not 
significantly influence firm performance in Indonesia. The finding of this paper shows that the argument 
put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which stated that managerial ownership better aligns 
managers’ interest with those of stockholders does not apply in Indonesian context. In addition, the 
maximisation of stockholders’ wealth which is expected to be achieved through directors’ ownership (Hill 
& Snell, 1989) cannot be confirmed in this paper. The findings of Mehran (1995), Han and Suk (1998), 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2008) are also not supported. 
The insignificant relationship between directors’ ownership and firm performance found in this 
paper might be evidence that the policy of share grant in directors’ executive remuneration package 
does not provide an incentive for directors to maximise the shareholder value. Therefore, shareholders 
are not recommended to include share grant in executive remuneration package. 
 
2. Suggestions 
This paper has some limitations that need to be addressed by future researchers: 
1. The samples are only collected from manufacturing industry. Future researchers are advised to 
incorporate samples from all industries to facilitate better and more comprehensive investigation 
of directors’ ownership-firm performance relationship. 
2. The relatively small sample size might weaken the validity and reliability of the research in this 
paper. Future researchers are advised to increase the sample size that can be achieved through 
incorporation of samples from other industries and/or primary data collection on the firms. 
3. This paper does not take into account the directors’ affiliation (affiliation to large shareholders, 
multiple directorship, etc). It is quite possible that this variable influences the relationship 
between directors’ ownership and firm performance. Therefore, future researchers are advised to 
take into account the directors’ affiliation so that it becomes clear whether directors’ ownership-
firm performance relationship is influenced by directors’ affiliation. 
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